EPROCESS.MitigationFlags in w10 build 16215

Lets see EPROCESS.Flags3 in w10 build 16193:
unsigned long Flags3;
unsigned long Minimal:0:1;
unsigned long ReplacingPageRoot:1:1;
unsigned long DisableNonSystemFonts:2:1;
unsigned long AuditNonSystemFontLoading:3:1;
unsigned long Crashed:4:1;
unsigned long JobVadsAreTracked:5:1;
unsigned long VadTrackingDisabled:6:1;
unsigned long AuxiliaryProcess:7:1;
unsigned long SubsystemProcess:8:1;
unsigned long IndirectCpuSets:9:1;
unsigned long InPrivate:a:1;
unsigned long ProhibitRemoteImageMap:b:1;
unsigned long ProhibitLowILImageMap:c:1;
unsigned long SignatureMitigationOptIn:d:1;
unsigned long DisableDynamicCodeAllowOptOut:e:1;
unsigned long EnableFilteredWin32kAPIs:f:1;
unsigned long AuditFilteredWin32kAPIs:10:1;
unsigned long PreferSystem32Images:11:1;
unsigned long RelinquishedCommit:12:1;
unsigned long Reserved:13:1;
unsigned long HighGraphicsPriority:14:1;
unsigned long CommitFailLogged:15:1;
unsigned long ReserveFailLogged:16:1;
unsigned long DisableDynamicCodeAllowRemoteDowngrade:17:1;
unsigned long LoaderIntegrityContinuityEnabled:18:1;
unsigned long LoaderIntegrityContinuityAudit:19:1;
unsigned long ControlFlowGuardExportSuppressionEnabled:1a:1;
unsigned long FatalAccessTerminationRequested:1b:1;
unsigned long DisableSystemAllowedCpuSet:1c:1;
unsigned long ControlFlowGuardStrict:1d:1;

and compare it with EPROCESS.Flags3 in w10 build 16215:
unsigned long Flags3;
unsigned long Minimal:0:1;
unsigned long ReplacingPageRoot:1:1;
unsigned long Crashed:2:1;
unsigned long JobVadsAreTracked:3:1;
unsigned long VadTrackingDisabled:4:1;
unsigned long AuxiliaryProcess:5:1;
unsigned long SubsystemProcess:6:1;
unsigned long IndirectCpuSets:7:1;
unsigned long RelinquishedCommit:8:1;
unsigned long HighGraphicsPriority:9:1;
unsigned long CommitFailLogged:a:1;
unsigned long ReserveFailLogged:b:1;
unsigned long SystemProcess:c:1;

dramatic difference

how to find PspUniqueJobIdTable

In his cool presentation Alex Ionescu said:

PspUniqueJobIdTable - no way to open/enumerate

Sure there are always some ways. Lets see xrefs to PspUniqueJobIdTable:

• PspJobDelete
• NtCreateJobObject
• PspInitializeJobStructures

no exported functions in this list (well, NtCreateJobObject can be considered as such). Looks deep in PspJobDelete: 

loc_14001B6B4:                          ; CODE XREF: PspJobDelete+2A3
                                        ; PspJobDelete+17FEA8
  test    dword ptr [rbx+518h], 40000000h ; EJOB.JobFlags
  jnz     loc_14019B3AD

loc_14001B6C4:                          ; CODE XREF: PspJobDelete+17FEB6
  mov     rax, gs:188h
  dec     word ptr [rax+1E4h]
  mov     eax, [rbx+4C4h]               ; EJOB.JobId
  test    eax, eax
  jz      short loc_14001B701
  mov     rcx, cs:PspUniqueJobIdTable
  mov     edx, eax
  call    ExMapHandleToPointer

There is very long and noticeable signature for testing of EJOB.JobFlags with value 0x40000000: 18 05 00 00 00 00 00 40
If you searching it in .text section you get only 5-6 matches. Now question is how to get offset to EJOB.JobFlags. It can be done from exported function PsGetCurrentSilo:
PsGetCurrentSilo proc near
  mov     rax, gs:188h
  cmp     qword ptr [rax+7C8h], 0FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFDh
  jnz     short loc_1400B61BF
  mov     rax, [rax+220h]               ; KTHREAD.Process
  mov     rax, [rax+3B0h]               ; EPROCESS.Job
  test    rax, rax
  jz      short locret_1400B61BE

loc_1400B61A6:                          ; CODE XREF: PsGetCurrentSilo+3Cj
  test    dword ptr [rax+518h], 40000000h ; EJOB.JobFlags

And few words about enumerating - it`s just good old HANDLE_TABLE, so we can use ExEnumHandleTable and get all Jobs IDs

wincheck rc8.57

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Changelog:

• add support of numerous versions of windows 10 insider preview - up to 16193
• add dumping of FilterConnectionPorts
• add support of RFG (and v2 too) 
• add dumping of ntdll!ProtectedPolicies
• add dumping of kernel etw traces (-wmi option)
• add dumping of EPROCESS.WnfContext
• add dumping of WNF kernelmode callbacks (-wnf option)

wnf kernelmode callbacks

I already described how to enum usermode wnf callbacks
Now it`s time to enum WNF callbacks in kernel
It is not surprising that they stored in EPROCESS.WnfContext, this struct is undocumented but can be partially recovered from function ExpWnfCreateProcessContext:
offset 0 - WORD signature 0x906
offset 4 - WORD - size 0x88 (0x44 for x86)
offset 8 - eprocess
offset 0x10 - linked list for WNF contexts
offset 0x28 - push lock
offset 0x40 - linked list
offset 0x58 - linked list
offset 0x70 - linked list

Lets see at this struct in windbg

kernel etw traces in windows 10

In windows 10 there is no good old EtwpGuidHashTable and all registered Etw stored in SILO. Let`s see how we can extract them

Check first function exported function EtwRegister:
  call    _PsGetCurrentServerSiloGlobals@0 ; PsGetCurrentServerSiloGlobals()
  push    [ebp+arg_C]
  mov     edx, [ebp+arg_0]
  push    dword ptr [ebp+4]
  mov     ecx, [eax+1F0h]               ; ESERVERSILO_GLOBALS.EtwSiloState
  push    [ebp+arg_8]
  push    [ebp+arg_4]
  push    3
  call    _EtwpRegisterProvider@28      ; EtwpRegisterProvider(x,x,x,x,x,x,x)

Function PsGetCurrentServerSiloGlobals returns processes SILO or default SILO PspHostSiloGlobals stored in kernel which has type ESERVERSILO_GLOBALS. Field EtwSiloState has type ETW_SILODRIVERSTATE:
struct _ETW_SILODRIVERSTATE {
  /*   0x0 */ /*|0x4|*/ struct _ESERVERSILO_GLOBALS* SiloGlobals;
  /*   0x8 */ /*|0x168|*/ struct _ETW_GUID_ENTRY EtwpSecurityProviderGuidEntry;
  /* 0x170 */ /*|0x100|*/ struct _EX_RUNDOWN_REF_CACHE_AWARE* EtwpLoggerRundown[64];
  /* 0x270 */ /*|0x100|*/ struct _WMI_LOGGER_CONTEXT* WmipLoggerContext[64];
  /* 0x370 */ /*|0x700|*/ struct _ETW_HASH_BUCKET EtwpGuidHashTable[64];
  /* 0xa70 */ /*|0x10|*/ unsigned short EtwpSecurityLoggers[8];
  /* 0xa80 */ /*|0x1|*/ unsigned char EtwpSecurityProviderEnableMask;
  /* 0xa84 */ /*|0x4|*/ long EtwpShutdownInProgress;
  /* 0xa88 */ /*|0x4|*/ unsigned long EtwpSecurityProviderPID;
  /* 0xa8c */ /*|0x10|*/ struct _ETW_PRIV_HANDLE_DEMUX_TABLE PrivHandleDemuxTable;
  /* 0xa9c */ /*|0x10|*/ struct _ETW_COUNTERS EtwpCounters;
  /* 0xab0 */ /*|0x8|*/ union _LARGE_INTEGER LogfileBytesWritten;
  /* 0xab8 */ /*|0x4|*/ struct _ETW_SILO_TRACING_BLOCK* ProcessorBlocks;
};

etwex - ida plugin for Etw traces IIDs searching

For example you may need to find which Etw providers located in some module. There are lots of functions can be used to register provider and manual searching is very boring
So I commited today code for Ida Pro plugin for Etw traces IIDs searching. It currently supports only 32bit PE files (much better if you load appropriate PDB file) and processing following functions:

• TraceLoggingRegister
• TraceLoggingRegisterEx
• WPP_INIT_GUID_ARRAY
• EtwRegister from import
• EtwEventRegister from import
• EventRegister from import

Samples of using:

ntdll ProtectedPolicies

It seems that since windows 10 ntdll has security feature called "ProtectedPolicies" - you can query it with RtlQueryProtectedPolicy function. Prototype of this function is:
NTAPI NTSTATUS RtlQueryProtectedPolicy(GUID *, PDWORD out_flag);

Lets see how it works:
loc_6A277EFB:   ; CODE XREF: RtlQueryProtectedPolicy(x,x)+12 j
  push    edi
  mov     edi, offset _RtlpProtectedPoliciesSRWLock
  push    edi
  call    _RtlAcquireSRWLockShared@4    ; RtlAcquireSRWLockShared(x)
  push    offset _RtlpSearchProtectedPolicyEntry ; PtFuncCompare
  push    14h                           ; SizeOfElements
  push    ds:_RtlpProtectedPoliciesActiveCount ; NumOfElements
  push    ds:_RtlpProtectedPolicies     ; Base
  push    [ebp+Key]                     ; Key
  call    _bsearch

That policies stored in array RtlpProtectedPolicies, count located in RtlpProtectedPoliciesActiveCount and size of each policy is 0x14 bytes (0x18 under x64), so each policy looks like struct:
struct protected_policy
{
  IID guid;
  DWORD flag;
};

Lets see from where RtlQueryProtectedPolicy called