hidden executable pages in linux kernel

Standard method to find rootkits like this (or like this) is cross-scanning PTEs of memory without NX bit, then extract pages belonging to LKMs - thus in set difference we will gather hidden executable memory. Lets check how we can scan PTEs under linux

disclaimer

this article is not digest of Intel or linux documentation - I'll just describe how you can traverse page tables from LKM. Also code

Lets start with some simple things:

cat /boot/config-$(uname -r) | grep -E 'X86_5LEVEL|PGTABLE_LEVELS'
CONFIG_PGTABLE_LEVELS=5
CONFIG_X86_5LEVEL=y


So my kernel has 5 levels and this exactly correspond to hardware:

1. pte_t - PTE, 9 bits of page address (size of page is 4096 bytes - low 12 bits)
   
2. pmd_t - PDE. another 9 bits of address
   
3. pud_t - PDPTE, 9 bits
   
4. p4d_t - PML4, 9 bits
   
5. pgd_t - PML5, 9 bits

Total 12 + 5 * 9 = 57bits

It's really amazing how memory management is implemented differently in different operating systems running on the same hardware. For example in Windows all PTE are located in huge contiguous sparse array and you can get address of PTE for some address of memory with very simple function MiGetPteAddress. Let MiGetPteAddress(addr1) is addr2. We then can continue this process for all paging levels - get PteAddress(addr2) and so on - to find if all 5 parts of address is valid. And this can be used in reverse direction - skip scan of huge PTEs areas if they are not presented in memory

Unfortunately in linux PTE not stored in one huge contiguous memory. So we need to start with top-level (from PGD) and scan all tables on lower levels. Root of pgd_t stored in init_mm->pgd. As usually var init_mm is not exported

<sarcasm>Linux widely known for the consistency, completeness and backward-compatibility of its API and being developers-friendly in general</sarcasm>

Next we need way to find valid pXX_t. Seems that there are functions pXX_present, pXX_bad and so on. The right sequence of calls is

• pXX_none
• pXX_leaf - this is damn good name for functions to check for large pages
• pXX_bad
• and finally pXX_offset to get item for next level

Unfortunately there are also so called hugeTLB pages (enabled with CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE):

grep 'HUGETLB_PAGE' /boot/config-$(uname -r)
CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE=y
CONFIG_HUGETLB_PAGE_FREE_VMEMMAP=y

As you may expect functions pmd_huge & pud_huge non-exported too (and p4d_huge & pgd_huge are just dumb macros)

Finally we need to check if some page is executable. This is very hardware specific - for example

• Arc has flag _PAGE_EXECUTE
• aarch64 has flag _PAGE_KERNEL_EXEC
  
• powerpc has _PAGE_EXEC
• s390 has _PAGE_NOEXEC

so for some arch there is function pte_exec, while for another pte_no_exec. Also it's curious that there are no analogs for pud/pmd etc - so actually I have zero ideas how check executability for large & huge pages

However, this is not the end of suffering. Quick check:

grep address /proc/cpuinfo
address sizes    : 39 bits physical, 48 bits virtual
shows that they lie - my hardware actually supports only 48bit addresses, so kernel should have only 4 levels of paging. Try to guess how they swept the trash under the carpet?

bpf_verifier_ops

Lets dissect some typical ebpf spyware. It sets up uprobes on

• SSL_read_ex
• SSL_read
• SSL_write_ex
• SSL_write
• gotls_write_register
  
• gotls_read_register
• gotls_exit_read_register

and uses bpf functions probe_read_user & probe_read_user_str to steal data and map_update_elem & ringbuf_submit to store data in bpf maps

How we can mitigate this?

Official way is to use LSM - function __sys_bpf calls security_bpf so we could register with security_add_hooks LSM hook with index bpf. This effectively prevents loading of ebpf program and sometimes is not what we want - for example in case of honeypots there is high chance that usermode program just will exits after failed ebpf program loading and you can't monitor which connections it will try to establish

Another way - is to patch bpf_func_proto for selected functions, like I did. However this is brutal method and affects all ebpf programs (I still believe that some is not spyware, he-he)

Luckily there is way to blind only some types of ebpf programs - method get_func_proto in bpf_verifier_ops. I made PoC to blind aforementioned 4 functions for BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING & BPF_PROG_TYPE_KPROBE only

Now we have another problem - how to check integrity of bpf_verifier_ops? I've also add this check in my lkcd. Example of output when PoC ublind is loaded looks like:

[24] type BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING at 0xffffffffc1357720 - ublind!s_trace_patched
  get_func_proto: 0xffffffffc13551e0 - ublind!my_func_proto
  is_valid_access: 0xffffffffaee24e20 - kernel!tracing_prog_is_valid_access